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Abstract
In dynamic resource allocation models, the non-existence of voting equilibria is
a generic phenomenon due to the multi-dimensionality of the choice space even with
agents heterogeneous only in their discount factors. Nevertheless, at each point of
time there may exist a “median voter” whose preferred instantaneous consumption
rate is supported by a majority of agents. Based on this observation, we propose an
institutional setup (“intertemporal majority voting”) in a Ramsey-type growth model
with common consumption and heterogeneous agents, and show that it provides a
microfoundation of the choice of the optimal consumption stream of the median
agent. While the corresponding intertemporal consumption stream is in general not
a Condorcet winner among all feasible paths, its induced instantaneous consumption
rate receives a majority at each point in time in the proposed intertemporal majority
voting procedure. We also provide a characterization of balanced-growth and steady-
state voting equilibria in the case in which agents may differ not only in their time
preference, but also in their instantaneous utility functions.
JEL Classification: D11, D71, D91, O13, O43.
Keywords: collective choice, common-pool resource, economic growth, heterogeneous
agents, median voter theorem.
1 Introduction
It is well-known that in multi-dimensional models a voting equilibrium under majority
rule fails to exist generically (Plott, 1967; McKelvey, 1976). This holds in particular in
dynamic multi-period resource allocation problems — even if choices at different points
in time are linked by an intertemporal resource constraint (Boylan et al., 1996), and even
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in cases where in addition the agents’ type space is one-dimensional (see, e.g., De Donder
et al., 2012). One-dimensional type spaces arise naturally when agents differ only in
discount rates, a case that has received considerable attention recently (see, e.g., Heal
and Millner, 2014; Jackson and Yariv, 2015).
Notwithstanding these negative results, at each point of time there may exist a “me-
dian voter” whose preferred choice of instantaneous consumption rate is supported by a
majority of agents. Based on this observation, we propose a simple institutional setup in a
Ramsey-type growth model, intertemporal majority voting, that does not suffer from the
problem of generic non-existence of equilibrium. Importantly, in this setup the temporary
voting is not over consumption levels but over consumption rates, since only the latter
variable entails a degree of freedom given the intertemporal resource constraint and the
decisions (on consumption rates) in all other periods. The equilibrium concept that we
employ is Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium with perfect foresight; that is, (i) each period’s
decision follows the (sincere) majority vote under the assumption that agents maximize
their utility given the outcomes of all other periods, and (ii) agents’ expectations about
these outcomes are correct in equilibrium (“perfect foresight”). It is worth emphasizing
that the institutional framework is well-defined also without the assumptions of utility
maximization and/or perfect foresight; evidently, in particular the latter condition is quite
restrictive.
Our main result shows that there is a unique Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium which yields
as outcome the optimal consumption stream of the agent with the median discount factor.
As an important intermediate step we establish that, for each fixed agent, the step-by-step
determination of the optimal consumption rate under perfect foresight yields the optimal
overall intertemporal consumption stream. While this technical result probably belongs
to the body of “folk wisdom” within the Ramsey model, we are not aware of a rigorous
proof and provide one here.
In our basic model, we assume that agents have the same instantaneous utility function
and differ only in their discount rates. We also consider the case of agents with different
utility functions. For this general case we provide a characterization of balanced-growth
and steady-state voting equilibria.
1.1 Common property resource problems
The problem of aggregating heterogeneous time preferences arises in many contexts.1 It
is instructive to consider this problem within the common property resource framework
both with renewable and exhaustible resources. Examples are the hunting for animals,
the grazing of cattle on a common ground, the pollution of the atmosphere, or the drilling
for oil in a common underground reservoir.
In these contexts, an issue of evident importance is the determination of the socially
desirable harvest rate. Concretely, consider a village situated near a fishing ground. The
fishing ground is self-managed by village citizens, who differ in their time preferences.
The question is: what is the harvest rate of the fish stock collectively set by heteroge-
neous agents? If all citizens in the village were identical, then the rate of the fish stock
exploitation could be easily determined using their common discount factor. However, it
is not at all clear how to determine the harvest rate when people have different discount
factors.
1For recent evidence that individuals indeed differ in their discount factors see, e.g., Wang et al. (2010),
Castillo et al. (2011), and Schaner (2015).
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One might try to argue that the introduction of property rights can (indirectly) solve
the problem. Indeed, the typical and well-known solution to the “tragedy of the commons”
is to establish private property rights. Once the property rights are enforced, each owner
just acts optimally according to her own time preference. This might indeed circumvent
the problem in cases where suitable property rights can be established.2
However, often the non-excludability of common goods prevents the enforcement of
suitable private property rights. This is likely to occur in the case of the underground
oil reservoir, the fishing ground, or the so-called “global commons”. For instance, the ten-
dency of fish to migrate makes it impossible to define geographically determined property
rights over the fish stock. In this case a solution may be to introduce a governmental or
community resource ownership, but then it is necessary to find a non-market mechanism
of determining the harvest rate.
1.2 Social choice in the optimal growth model
A natural framework for the analysis of collective intertemporal decision problems of the
sort just described is the optimal growth model originally developed by Ramsey (1928).
This model can be generalized to a multi-agent model with several types of individuals
differentiated by their rates of time preference. There is a vast amount of literature
devoted to the Ramsey general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents who differ
in their discount factors (see Becker, 2006, for an excellent survey). In this kind of models
each agent separately solves her own optimization problem and thus has an independent
private consumption stream.
However, the Ramsey framework also allows one to study how heterogeneous agents
make joint decisions over common consumption streams. Note that it does not matter
whether “common consumption” is a collectively consumed public good or a private good
that is consumed according to some fixed and commonly known sharing rule. What is
important is that agents’ personal utilities are based on their collective decisions, i.e.,
on the common consumption stream they choose. Here, economic growth theory meets
social choice theory, and there is indeed a literature that analyzes how political institutions
can be incorporated into growth models in order to determine collective choices among
heterogeneous agents (see, e.g., Beck, 1978; Boylan, 1995; Boylan et al., 1996).
A natural way of aggregating heterogeneous preferences is voting. Suppose that agents
vote over all feasible consumption streams by pairwise majority voting. Then, it is well-
known that, due to the high dimensionality of the underlying choice space, there does in
general not exist a Condorcet winner, i.e., for every feasible consumption stream there
exists another feasible consumption stream that is preferred by a majority (see, e.g.,
Davis et al., 1972; Kramer, 1973; Bucovetsky, 1990).3 Moreover, the fact that agents
differ only in one parameter does not help: there still is no Condorcet winner in voting
over multi-dimensional choice space even if the agents’ type space is one-dimensional
(see, e.g., De Donder et al., 2012). Boylan et al. (1996) consider voting over feasible
consumption paths in the Ramsey optimal growth model and prove that there is in general
no Condorcet winner. In a more recent paper, Jackson and Yariv (2015) analyze the case
of agents who differ only in their discount factor, and prove a general impossibility theorem
which implies, among other things, that any non-dictatorial aggregation rule of feasible
2If the “owners” are groups of individuals with heterogeneous time preferences, the problem might of
course persist within these groups.
3Bernheim and Slavov (2007) characterized this kind of situation as the “curse of dimensionality”.
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consumption plans satisfying mild further conditions admits cyclical social preferences.
Despite these negative results, it appears that in a model in which agents differ only in
their discount factor, the optimal consumption path of the agent with the median discount
factor has some claim for being a natural and appealing collective choice. But clearly,
the mentioned impossibility results imply in particular that also the optimal consumption
path for the median agent cannot be a Condorcet winner among all feasible paths, i.e.,
there generally exist feasible consumption paths that are preferred by a majority of agents
to the optimal consumption path of the median agent.4
One way to overcome this difficulty has been considered by Beck (1978) and, more
recently, by Heal and Millner (2014). In these models, agents are simply only allowed
to vote over the set of individually optimal paths. It can be shown that, among all
individually optimal paths, the optimal path for the agent with the median discount
factor is indeed a Condorcet winner. However, ensuring the existence of a stable voting
outcome in this way is not very satisfactory since it is made possible only by severely
restricting the choice set.
A different voting mechanism in the Ramsey framework is proposed by Boylan et al.
(1996). These authors introduce two additional agents (“political candidates”) to the
model. In each period the candidates propose a consumption level for the agents and
care only about being elected. Agents vote for one of the candidates and care only about
consumption. A specific noncooperative game is then constructed, and it is shown that
the subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with the optimal path for the median agent.
Although it yields the desired and intuitive outcome, this voting procedure seems quite
contrived and complex.
The purpose of the present paper is to propose a more intuitive and tractable voting
procedure that yields the optimal consumption path of the agent with the median discount
factor as outcome.5
1.3 Intertemporal majority voting over consumption rates
We consider a Ramsey-type growth model with agents differing in their time preferences.
Agents maximize their intertemporal discounted utilities by allocating at each point in
time a given amount of single good between consumption, which provides instant utility,
and investment, which is used in production. The technology is described by a neoclassical
production function.
We suppose that agents share a common consumption stream. The good is either
consumed collectively, or privately according to some fixed sharing rule. In the common
property resource interpretation of the Ramsey model with common consumption, the
capital stock is viewed as the resource stock, and the consumption level is the amount
4In fact, one can show that there exist feasible paths that are preferred to the optimal path of the
median agent by all other agents. These paths are obtained by increasing the consumption in earlier and
later periods, which makes both the impatient and the patient agents better off, and by reducing the
consumption in intermediate periods in order to make the path feasible.
5The general idea to use dynamic voting in order to determine a stable outcome has been investigated
in a number of specific models. In Borissov et al. (2014a) agents vote for a tax aimed at environmental
maintenance; Borissov et al. (2014b) study voting over the shares of public goods in GDP, and Borissov
and Pakhnin (2014) consider voting over extraction rates in two models of economic growth with ex-
haustible natural resources. In all cases, the equilibrium policy is determined by the agent with the
median discount factor as in the present paper. However, these models lack generality because they use
specific forms of the utility and production functions.
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of the resource extracted. In other words, the consumption level equals the harvest rate
(extraction rate in the exhaustible resource case) times the available resource stock. The
production function becomes the regeneration function if the resource is renewable, and
represents the pure storage technology if the resource is exhaustible.
Within this framework, we propose a simple and natural voting mechanism according
to which agents choose a consumption path for society from the set of all feasible con-
sumption paths by “intertemporal majority voting.” The two crucial principles in this
institutional setup are that (i) voting is done “step-by-step” at each point of time, and
(ii) the vote is not over the consumption level itself, but over the consumption rate. We
thus avoid the “curse of dimensionality” by converting a multi-dimensional choice space
into a series of one-dimensional choice spaces. Indeed, the dynamic intertemporal struc-
ture of the Ramsey model naturally suggests to consider institutions that also allow for
intertemporal choices of agents. The solution concept given the proposed intertemporal
voting procedure is Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium (Kramer, 1972; Shepsle, 1979). In gen-
eral, a vector of policies is a Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium if, for any single dimension,
the corresponding policy in this dimension coincides with the majority choice, given the
equilibrium choices in all other dimensions.6
Given the general idea to transform the multi-dimensional choice problem into a se-
quence of one-dimensional choice problems, an important issue that has to be addressed
is what the choice variable should be. Indeed, one-dimensional voting over the current
consumption level given the consumption levels in all other periods is pointless, since
consumption in each period is uniquely determined by consumption in all other periods
via the overall resource constraint. Thus, there is no trade-off between consumption to-
day and consumption in the future (we provide a simple example in Section 3 below to
illustrate this point), and formally, every feasible consumption path is a Kramer–Shepsle
equilibrium in the Ramsey model.
To implement the idea of intertemporal majority voting in a fruitful manner, we have
to look at the Ramsey model from a slightly different perspective. Originally, the model
is formulated in terms of consumption levels, and mathematically, it involves an optimal
control problem with the consumption level as the control variable. We make a change of
variables and use instead the consumption rate (i.e., 1−savings rate) as control variable.7
Using this change of variable, we define a voting equilibrium in two stages. First, for any
point in time agents vote by majority rule over the current consumption rate, given the
current capital stock and their expectations about future consumption rates. This yields a
one-dimensional decision problem, and we show that agents’ preferences over the current
consumption rate are single-peaked. If, in addition, agents have the same instantaneous
utility function and the same expectations, at each given point in time the temporary
voting equilibrium (i.e., the instantaneous Condorcet winner) is the preferred consumption
rate of the agent with the median discount factor. The intertemporal majority voting
equilibrium is then defined as a sequence of temporary voting outcomes such that all
agents’ expectations are correct. We prove that if agents have the same instantaneous
utility function, there is a unique intertemporal voting equilibrium, which is given by the
6Clearly, if the multi-dimensional problem admits a Condorcet winner, then the Condorcet winner con-
stitutes a Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium.
7The savings rate as control variable in the Ramsey model has been used by Phelps and Pollak (1968)
and Peleg and Yaari (1973). These authors study agents’ behavior in the optimal growth model with
time-inconsistent preferences, and ask under which conditions the chosen plan of actions will be actu-
ally followed by rational individuals in the future. By contrast, we assume time-consistent preferences
throughout.
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optimal consumption path for the agent with the median discount factor. The proof is
based on the general result that the step-by-step determination of the consumption rate
under perfect foresight for any given agent results in the (“once-and-for-all”) optimum
in terms of consumption levels for this agent. This result, though not surprising, is of
interest in itself, and we discuss it in some detail in Section 4 below.
We thus view our analysis as providing an institutional “microfoundation” for the
choice of the optimal consumption path of the agent with the median discount factor,
a proposal that has been repeatedly put forward in the literature but without an ulti-
mately appealing justification so far. If agents differ both in their discount factors and
instantaneous utility functions, the intertemporal voting equilibrium is clearly no longer
determined by the discount factor alone. However, we are still able to generalize our
analysis to two special cases of such multi-dimensional heterogeneity.
The first is the case when the production function is linear and the utility functions
of agents have constant elasticities of intertemporal substitution. We define a balanced-
growth voting equilibrium, prove its uniqueness and show that it only depends on the
median growth rate. The second is the case when the production function is strictly
concave, while utility functions are completely general. In this case, we define a steady-
state voting equilibrium, and show that it is unique and fully determined by the agent
with the median discount factor.
1.4 Further remarks on related literature
The outcome of our notion of intertemporal majority voting (i.e., the optimal consumption
path of the median agent) is clearly both time-consistent and Pareto efficient. This
may seem at odds with the result of Jackson and Yariv (2015), who argue that any
time-consistent and Pareto efficient voting rule must be dictatorial. There is in fact
no contradiction here since the choice of an optimal path of one agent is indeed ex post
“dictatorial.” Note, however, that unlike Jackson’s and Yariv’s notion, the usual definition
of dictatorship in social choice theory is a much stronger notion of ex ante dictatorship: an
aggregation rule is dictatorial if only one agent is decisive no matter what the preferences
of all other agents’ are. Evidently, any aggregation rule that follows the preferences of
the median voter is necessarily “ex post dictatorial,” but this does not imply dictatorship
in the usual sense of social choice theory. The same holds for the choice of the optimal
consumption path of the median agent under our institutional setup.
We emphasize that in this paper we do not address questions related to uncertainty of
future economic development. There is a lively and ongoing discussion on how to discount
the future under uncertainty (see, e.g., Pearce et al., 2003; Gollier and Weitzman, 2010;
Traeger, 2013). While the introduction of uncertainty seems to bring the problem of
choosing a consumption path closer to real life decisions, it also complicates matters quite
dramatically. Our hope is that, even though our analysis does not directly contribute
to the literature of discounting the future under uncertainty, the idea of intertemporal
majority voting might be also fruitfully applicable to this more general setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic setup of the
Ramsey model in terms of consumption levels. Section 3 provides a simple but instructive
example of implementing the step-by-step optimization and voting procedures. In Section
4 we present the Ramsey model in terms of consumption rates and consider the step-
by-step decision-making process. We define a step-by-step intertemporal optimum and
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show that in the Ramsey model a step-by-step intertemporal optimum coincides with
the optimum in terms of consumption rates. In Section 5 we proceed to intertemporal
majority voting over consumption rates and define an intertemporal voting equilibrium.
Section 6 states our main result under the assumption that all agents have the same
instantaneous utility function. In this case an intertemporal voting equilibrium is unique
and coincides with the optimum in terms of consumption rates for the agent with the
median discount factor. In Section 7 we study the general case where agents differ both
in their discount factors and utility functions. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a Ramsey-type growth model with heterogeneous agents and common con-
sumption. Suppose T ∈ N∪{∞} is the length of the time horizon, which can be finite or
infinite. Let time be T = {0, 1, . . . , T} when T <∞, and T = {0, 1, . . .} when T =∞.
There is an odd number N of heterogeneous agents indexed by i = {1, 2, . . . , N}.
The heterogeneity is captured by agents’ discount factors and utility functions. Suppose
agent i has a discount factor δi ∈ (0, 1), and an instantaneous utility function ui(c) which
satisfies the following conditions:
ui(c) : R++ → R, u′i(c) > 0, u′′i (c) < 0, lim
c→0
u′i(c) = +∞.
Agent’s preferences over consumption streams C = {ct}t∈T are represented by the
intertemporal utility function
U i =
∑
t∈T
δtiui(ct). (1)
We consider the economy in which a single homogeneous good is produced. In each pe-
riod t ∈ T the available amount of good in the economy is allocated between consumption8
ct and capital kt+1 for use in the next period production:
ct + kt+1 = f(kt), t ∈ T,
where f(k) is the production function. We assume that f(k) either is linear,
f(k) = Ak, A > 0, (2)
or satisfies the following properties:
f(0) = 0, f ′(k) > 0, f ′′(k) < 0, ∃k¯ : f(k¯) = k¯, δminf ′(0) > 1, (3)
where δmin is the minimal discount factor in the set {δi}Ni=1.9
Suppose k0 > 0 is given. We call a sequence {C,K} = {ct, kt+1}t∈T a feasible path if
ct + kt+1 = f(kt), ct ≥ 0, kt+1 ≥ 0, t ∈ T.
8We suppose that the good is either consumed collectively or it is consumed privately, in which case
there is some fixed and commonly known sharing rule. If, for instance, this rule is egalitarian, then ui(c)
should be replaced with ui(c/N). However, this is of no importance for our considerations and results.
9In the common property resource problem interpretation, f(k) = k describes the exhaustible resource
stock dynamics, and the Ramsey problem becomes the “cake-eating” problem of Gale (1967). A function
f(k) that satisfies (3) describes a regenerative capacity of the renewable resource.
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Consider the following optimization problem:
max
∑
t∈T
δtiui(ct),
s. t. ct + kt+1 = f(kt), ct ≥ 0, kt+1 ≥ 0, t ∈ T.
(4)
Definition. A solution to problem (4), {Ci∗, Ki∗} = {ci∗t , ki∗t+1}t∈T, is called an optimum
in terms of consumption levels for agent i.
If the production functions satisfies (3), then maximization problem (4) has a unique
solution (optimal path). If the production functions satisfies (2), then in what follows we
additionally assume that problem (4) has a solution (optimal path) for each agent i.
3 Intertemporal majority voting: an example
The most natural idea to overcome the absence of a Condorcet winner is to convert a
multi-dimensional choice space, made up of sequences of consumptions, into a series of
one-dimensional choice spaces. The basic idea of “coordinate-wise” majority voting was
proposed independently by Kramer (1972) and Shepsle (1979).
Suppose that today agents vote only over current consumption, under some expec-
tations about future consumption. We may hope that there exists a stable outcome of
this one-dimensional voting. However, this reasonable and appealing idea cannot be ap-
plied directly to voting over consumption streams. To see why, consider the following
three-period example.
Suppose the intertemporal utility functions in terms of consumption levels are log-
linear. Suppose also the production function is f(k) = k, so that the resource constraints
are
c0 + k1 = k0, c1 + k2 = k1, c2 + k3 = k2,
where k0 > 0 is given. It is evident that k3 must be zero, so the overall resource constraint
is given by
c0 + c1 + c2 = k0.
The utility maximization problem in terms of consumption levels for agent i is as
follows:
max
{
ln c0 + δi ln c1 + δ
2
i ln c2
}
,
s. t. c0 + c1 + c2 = k0.
The solution to this problem is:
ci∗0 =
k0
1 + δi + δ2i
, ci∗1 =
δik0
1 + δi + δ2i
, ci∗2 =
δ2i k0
1 + δi + δ2i
,
ki∗1 =
(δi + δ
2
i )k0
1 + δi + δ2i
, ki∗2 =
δ2i k0
1 + δi + δ2i
, ki∗3 = 0.
Suppose that at time 0 agents have some expectations about future consumption, c1
and c2. Agents vote over the time 0 consumption c0. The preferred time 0 consumption
for agent i is a solution to the following problem:
max
c0
ln c0,
s. t. c0 = k0 − (c1 + c2).
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However, this optimization problem is degenerate. The overall resource constraint un-
der given expectations determines a unique feasible and hence the optimal value of c0.
Moreover, this value is the same for all agents.
Thus if agents choose current consumption under some expectations about the future,
then it is optimal for all agents to consume today as much as possible, given the future
consumption profile and the initial amount of capital. It follows that every feasible path,
i.e., the sequence {c0, c1, c2} such that c0 + c1 + c2 = k0, can be a result of intertempo-
ral majority voting under perfect foresight. This voting mechanism seems to be quite
senseless.
However, this example does not reduce the power of the idea to convert voting over
the multi-dimensional sequence into the sequence of the one-dimensional votes. To look
at the same example from a different perspective, let us formulate the initial problem in
terms of consumption rates,
et =
ct
f(kt)
=
ct
kt
,
instead of consumption levels ct. It is clear that 0 ≤ et ≤ 1.
The objective function in terms of consumption rates of agent i takes the form
V i(e0, e1, e2) = ln (e0k0) + δi ln (e1(1− e0)k0) + δ2i ln (e2(1− e1)(1− e0)k0) ,
where k0 > 0 is given.
The solution to the utility maximization problem in terms of consumption rates (op-
timum in terms of consumption rates) for agent i is:
{ei∗0 , ei∗1 , ei∗2 } =
{
1
1 + δi + δ2i
,
1
1 + δi
, 1
}
.
Now let us apply the intertemporal majority voting procedure to the problem formu-
lated in terms of consumption rates. Agents vote over the current consumption rate under
given past consumption rates and expectations about future consumption rates. Suppose
that at time 0 expectations about future consumption rates are e1 and e2. Then the
preferred time 0 consumption rate for agent i, ei0, is the solution to the following problem:
max
0≤e0≤1
V i(e0, e1, e2).
Since
∂V i(e0, e1, e2)
∂e0
= 0⇔ 1
e0
=
δi
(1− e0) +
δ2i
(1− e0) ,
we obtain ei0 =
1
1+δi+δ2i
.
In this particular case, due to the simplicity of the example, ei0 does not depend on
expectations about future consumption rates. Note also, that it coincides with ei∗0 , which
is the first element in the optimum in terms of consumption rates for this agent.
It is easily seen that preferences of agents in one-dimensional voting over e0 are single-
peaked, and the preferred values ei0 are decreasing in δi. By the median voter theorem,
a Condorcet winner is the preferred time 0 consumption rate for the median agent, e∗0 =
1
1+δmed+δ
2
med
, where δmed is the median discount factor.
Now consider voting over the time 1 consumption rate. Agents already know the time
0 consumption rate, which is the winner e∗0. They also have expectations about the time
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2 consumption rate, e2. Then the preferred time 1 consumption rate for agent i, ei1, is a
solution to the following problem:
max
0≤e1≤1
V i(e∗0, e1, e2).
We have
∂V i(e∗0, e1, e2)
∂e1
= 0⇔ δi
e1
=
δ2i
(1− e1) .
Thus ei1 =
1
1+δi
.
It is clear that the preferred time 1 consumption rate for each agent does not depend on
previous decisions or expectations about future consumption rates, and coincides with the
second element in the optimum in terms of consumption rates for the corresponding agent.
By the median voter theorem, a Condorcet winner is the preferred time 1 consumption
rate for the median agent, e∗1 =
1
1+δmed
.
Finally, the problem of finding the preferred time 2 consumption rate for agent i, ei2,
takes the form:
max
0≤e2≤1
V i(e∗0, e
∗
1, e2).
Clearly, the solution is ei2 = ei∗2 = 1. Since all agents vote unanimously, a Condorcet
winner is e∗2 = 1.
Thus we obtain the sequence of consumption rates
E∗ = {e∗0, e∗1, e∗2} =
{
1
1 + δmed + δ2med
,
1
1 + δmed
, 1
}
.
Each element of E∗ is a Condorcet winner in one-dimensional voting over the single
consumption rate at the corresponding moment of time under known values of previous
consumption rates and under given expectations about future consumption rates.
It is easily seen that the sequence E∗ is the solution to the utility maximization problem
in terms of consumption rates for the median agent. It is also clear that E∗ corresponds
to the solution to the utility maximization problem in terms of consumption levels for the
median agent.
This simple example illustrates two important aspects of using consumption rate as
the control variable. First, for each agent step-by-step optimization under given values of
past consumption rates and expectations about future consumption rates yields the same
result as the optimum in terms of consumption rates. Second, intertemporal majority
voting over consumption rates yields the optimum in terms of consumption rates for the
median agent as the outcome.
There is a natural question: can the step-by-step optimizing procedure (and hence the
intertemporal majority voting procedure) be generalized to any Ramsey-type model? In
the general case, the outcome of the time τ optimization problem (i.e., the preferred time
τ consumption rate) for each agent is a function of all future consumption rates. Hence
to apply a step-by-step optimization procedure in the general case, we need to introduce
and specify agents’ expectations about future consumption rates.
If agents form naive expectations, there is no reason to presume that the outcome of
the step-by-step optimization procedure is optimal. However, we show that if an agent has
perfect foresight about future decisions, then the sequence of consumption rates chosen
step by step coincides with her optimum in terms of consumption rates. Moreover, if
agents’ utility functions are identical, the outcome of the intertemporal majority voting
procedure under perfect foresight is the optimum in terms of consumption rates for the
agent with the median discount factor.
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4 Step-by-step intertemporal optimum
In this section we consider the optimization problem in terms of consumption rates, define
a step-by-step intertemporal optimum and show that in the Ramsey model a step-by-step
intertemporal optimum coincides with the optimum in terms of consumption rates. This
simple result seems not surprising and is in fact quite natural. However, to the best of
our knowledge, it has not yet been explicitly stated and proved.
In the optimal control problem (4) the control variable is consumption ct. We make a
change of variables:
et =
ct
f(kt)
, (5)
and rewrite the initial problem in terms of consumption rates.10 Since kt+1 ≥ 0 and
ct ≥ 0, it follows that 0 ≤ et ≤ 1. We call a sequence E = {et}t∈T, such that 0 ≤ et ≤ 1
for all t ∈ T, a feasible sequence of consumption rates.
Taking into account (5) and the constraints in (4), we can express consumption and
the capital stock at time t in terms of k0 and all previous consumption rates:
ct = etf ((1− et−1)f ((1− et−2)f(. . . f(k0)))) , t ∈ T,
kt+1 = (1− et)f ((1− et−1)f ((1− et−2)f(. . . f(k0)))) , t ∈ T. (6)
It is clear that given k0, a feasible path {ct, kt+1}t∈T uniquely corresponds to a feasible
sequence of consumption rates {et}t∈T, and vice versa.
Using (6), we incorporate the resource constraints into the objective function which
takes the form:
V i(e0, e1, . . .) = ui (e0f(k0)) +
δiui (e1f ((1− e0)f(k0))) + δ2i ui (e2f ((1− e1)f ((1− e0)f(k0)))) + . . . . (7)
Problem (4), rewritten in terms of consumption rates, is given by:
max
∑
t∈T
δtiui (etf ((1− et−1)f ((1− et−2)f(. . . f(k0))))) ,
s. t. 0 ≤ et ≤ 1, t ∈ T.
(8)
Definition. A solution to problem (8), Ei∗ = {ei∗t }t∈T, is called an optimum in terms of
consumption rates for agent i.
Suppose k0 > 0 is given. It is clear that if {Ci∗, Ki∗} is the optimum in terms of
consumption levels, then the sequence Ei∗ constructed using (5) is the optimum in terms
of consumption rates. Moreover, if Ei∗ is an optimum in terms of consumption rates,
then the sequence {Ci∗, Ki∗} constructed according to (6) is the optimum in terms of
consumption levels. Thus, for each agent there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the optimum in terms of consumption levels and the optimum in terms of consumption
rates. It follows that there is a unique optimum in terms of consumption rates for each
agent.
10We apply the change of the control variable similar to that of Phelps and Pollak (1968), and Peleg
and Yaari (1973). They used as control variable savings rate, which in the Ramsey model is naturally
related to consumption rate: kt+1/f(kt) = st = 1− et. However, in the decision-making context it seems
reasonable to use consumption rate instead of savings rate. Note also that in the apparent economic
interpretation of the Ramsey model with common consumption, the common property resource problem,
consumption rate et becomes harvest or extraction rate.
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Intertemporal discounted utility in the Ramsey model is maximized “once-and-for-all”
at the initial moment of time in an essentially atemporal way. However, choices in the
real world can hardly be regarded as “once-and-for-all” choices among specific plans of
actions. Instead, they are sequential step-by-step choices based on the presently available
opportunities. To illustrate this point, Koopmans (1967) uses a metaphor of ascending
a mountain covered with fog. In these circumstances, instead of looking for a “largely
invisible optimal path”, it is better to take small steps towards the top using only local
information. This metaphor leads to an important recommendation: “it is desirable that
models of optimal growth be designed so as to require, and make use of, only information
actually or potentially available at the time of decisions affecting growth” (Koopmans,
1967).
The difference between the two types of decision-making can be described as the prob-
lem of precommitment. The “once-and-for-all” solution to the Ramsey model is optimal
provided the individual can credibly commit to implement her decisions in the future.
There arises a natural question, what is the optimal strategy for the decision-maker if she
cannot precommit her future behavior?
To answer this question, Strotz (1956) (see also Pollak, 1968) considered time-
inconsistent preferences and introduced the “strategy of consistent planning”: the agent
should choose the best plan she would actually follow. A consistent plan is the solution in
the dynamic programming sense (see Bellman, 1957). Each period the individual chooses
the optimal policy under the assumption that future policies are optimally chosen. It is
shown that in the Ramsey model the consistent plan coincides with the “once-and-for-all”
solution.
Phelps and Pollak (1968), also in the context of time-inconsistent preferences, propose
another strategy that can be used if the decision-maker cannot precommit her future
behavior. They note that it is convenient to study sequential step-by-step choices in the
Ramsey model using savings rate as control variable. They introduce the sequence of
savings rates which is the equilibrium in the Nash sense: savings rate in each period
is optimally chosen provided all other savings rates are also optimal. Clearly, such an
equilibrium has the following consistency property: in any period there is no motivation
for the individual to change or to regret her action, given her actions in all other periods.
Note that the sequence of savings rates which is optimal in the dynamic programming
sense, i.e., the “once-and-for-all” solution, is always the Nash equilibrium. However, the
converse need not be true. The Nash equilibrium sequence of savings rates need not
coincide with the “once-and-for-all” solution in terms of savings rates. This actually
means that the Nash equilibrium may exist in more general circumstances. Indeed, Peleg
and Yaari (1973) use savings rate as control variable in the optimal growth model in
which utility changes over time. While in their framework the “once-and-for-all” solution
does not, in general, exist, they prove that there exists the Nash equilibrium sequence of
savings rates.
Unlike the scholars mentioned above, we are not interested in the time-inconsistency
issues. We consider the Ramsey model with time-consistent preferences. Our goal is to
study the correspondence between the two solutions. One of the results of Phelps and
Pollak (1968) is that in the model with the CES utility function and the AK production
function the “once-and-for-all” solution (in terms of savings rates) coincides with the Nash
equilibrium sequence of savings rates. We show that this result is valid for more general
forms of utility and production functions.
Consider problem (8) for an arbitrary agent, and omit the index i for the simplicity of
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notation. Suppose that the optimal sequence of consumption rates is not chosen “once-
and-for-all” at time 0. Instead, the decision-making process is as follows: at time τ the
agent chooses consumption rate eτ . This decision is made under given available capital
stock kτ and some expectations about future consumption rates. The resulting value,
which may depend on kτ and expectations, we call a time τ temporary optimum. Clearly,
the new capital stock kτ+1 is fully determined by kτ and the time τ temporary optimum
eτ . Then, at time τ + 1, the agent chooses eτ+1 under given kτ+1 and expectations about
future consumption rates, and so on.
This step-by-step decision-making procedure seems realistic and is in line with Koop-
mans’s recommendation. However, there arises a question of whether the result of this
procedure is optimal for the agent. We define a step-by-step intertemporal optimum as the
sequence, each element of which is a time τ temporary optimum given the current capital
stock and provided the agent has perfect foresight about future consumption rates. We
show that a step-by-step intertemporal optimum coincides with the optimum in terms of
consumption rates. In other words, if the agent at each date, starting from t = 0, sequen-
tially makes the decisions under perfect foresight, then the consumption rate eτ chosen
at time τ coincides with the consumption rate eτ chosen at time 0 “once-and-for-all”.
Formally, let τ be an arbitrary point in time. Denote
Eτ,t = {eτ , eτ+1, . . . , et}.
Suppose the capital stock is kτ , and the agent has some expectations about future
consumption rates represented by a finite or infinite sequence Eτ+1,T = {et}Tt=τ+1. We
assume that agent’s expectations are non-degenerate, i.e., 0 < et < 1 for all t (except the
terminal time T in the finite horizon problem). Then the objective function in the time
τ optimization problem is
Vτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,T ) =
T∑
t=τ
δt−τu (etf ((1− et−1)f ((1− et−2)f(. . . f(kτ ))))) . (9)
Definition. Given kτ and non-degenerate expectations Eτ+1,T , we call e∗τ (kτ , Eτ+1,T ) a
time τ temporary optimum if it is a solution to the one-dimensional optimization
problem:
max
0≤eτ≤1
Vτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,T ).
If T < +∞, a terminal time T optimum e∗T is a solution to the problem
max
0≤eT≤1
VT (kT , eT ) = u (eTf(kT )) ,
under given kT . It is immediately clear that a terminal time T optimum is the same for
all agents, and e∗T = 1.
It follows from (6) that every state variable in the initial (time 0) problem, kτ+1 for
τ ∈ T, is actually determined by the sequence of previously chosen consumption rates
E0,τ = {e0, e1, . . . , eτ}. For a given k0 > 0, let us denote k0,0 = k0, and recursively define
the functions k0,τ (·, ·) as:
k0,1(k0, E0,0) = (1− e0)f (k0,0) ,
. . . ,
k0,τ (k0, E0,τ−1) = (1− eτ−1)f (k0,τ−1(k0, E0,τ−2)) ,
. . . .
(10)
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Definition. We call a sequence E∗0,T = {e∗τ}Tτ=0 a step-by-step intertemporal opti-
mum if
e∗τ = e
∗
τ
(
k0,τ (k0, E
∗
0,τ−1), E
∗
τ+1,T
)
, τ ∈ T,
and 0 < e∗τ < 1 for all τ except the terminal time T in the finite horizon problem.
That is, every element e∗τ of a step-by-step intertemporal optimum is a time τ tem-
porary optimum provided that all previous consumption rates were chosen according to
the same procedure, kτ = k0,τ (k0, E∗0,τ−1),11 and under perfect foresight about future con-
sumption rates. Conditions e∗τ 6= 0 and e∗τ 6= 1 (for all τ except the terminal time T in
the finite horizon problem) rule our degenerate optima. Formally speaking, there can be
step-by-step intertemporal optima of the form {1, 1, . . .}, which are clearly of no interest.
The construction of a step-by-step intertemporal optimum is an essentially dynamic
process. At time 0, given the initial capital stock k0, the agent maximizes the objec-
tive function V0(k0, e0, E1,T ) with respect to e0, under some expectations about future
consumption rates, E1,T . The solution of this problem, a time 0 temporary optimum,
generically depends on these expectations. If the agent has perfect foresight at time 0,
and the solution is interior, then the outcome of this procedure, e∗0, is the first element in
a step-by-step intertemporal optimum.
Then, at time 1, the available capital stock k1 aggregates the decision made at time
0. The agent knows the value of k1, no matter whether the decision at time 0 was made
under perfect foresight or not. Given k1 the agent maximizes the objective function
V1(k1, e1, E2,T ) with respect to e1 under some expectations12 about future consumption
rates, E2,T . Thus the agent obtains a time 1 temporary optimum. If k1 is determined by
e∗0, the agent has perfect foresight at time 1, and the solution is interior, then the outcome
e∗1 is the second element in a step-by-step intertemporal optimum.
This process continues infinitely (if T =∞), or until the terminal time T (if T <∞).
At every date τ the agent considers the stock kτ as given and solves the time τ optimization
problem under some expectations about future consumption rates. The agent finds the
consumption rate eτ , imposing no requirements on the past and future decisions, and
treating them as given. If at each date, starting from time 0, the agent acts sequentially
under perfect foresight, and all the solutions are interior, then the resulting sequence is a
step-by-step intertemporal optimum.
Note the important distinction between the described step-by-step procedure and dy-
namic programming. In the dynamic programming approach every time τ decision looks
as if it is made separately from future decisions. However, Bellman’s principle of optimal-
ity emphasizes optimality of future decisions and presupposes that the decision at time τ
is made under explicit assumption that all future decisions are also made optimally. Thus
the optimal solution today is essentially based on the optimal behaviour in the future. On
the contrary, in the described above step-by-step optimization procedure future decisions
are not supposed to be optimal. The emphasis is placed on perfect foresight.
It should be noticed that technically a step-by-step intertemporal optimum for agent i
coincides with the non-degenerate outcome of coordinate-wise maximization of the objec-
tive function (7). Indeed, the latter is a sequence {e∗τ}∞τ=0 such that each e∗τ is a solution
11Note that the sequence E∗0,τ−1 contains the first τ elements from the step-by-step intertemporal optimum
E∗0,T , i.e., E
∗
0,τ−1 = {e∗t }τ−1t=0 .
12Expectations about consumption rates formed at time τ+1 may not be the same as expectations formed
at time τ .
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to the atemporal problem
max
0≤eτ≤1
V i(e∗0, . . . , e∗τ−1, eτ , e∗τ+1, . . .).
That is, e∗τ is a result of maximization of V i(e0, e1, . . .) with respect to eτ , provided all
other variables are already chosen according to the same procedure.13
Clearly, if a sequence is the optimum in terms of consumption rates (the “once-and-for-
all” solution), then this sequence is also obtained by coordinate-wise maximization. There
arises a question, is the opposite also true, i.e., is the sequence obtained by coordinate-wise
maximization an optimum in terms of consumption rates?
The following proposition shows that the answer to this question is positive in the
finite horizon Ramsey model. The same result in the infinite horizon problem holds with
the additional requirement that the marginal instantaneous utility tends to infinity at
zero not too fast. We say that the instantaneous utility function u(c) satisfies regularity
condition if there exists γ > 0 such that
lim
c→0
cγu′(c) = 0. (11)
Condition (11) means that the derivative u′(c) tends to infinity at c → 0 no faster than
any power function.14 For instance, functions u(c) = ln c and u(c) = cθ/θ for θ < 1,
which are widely used in the literature, meet this regularity requirement. Moreover,
every instantaneous utility function defined at zero (i.e., defined over R+) also satisfies
(11).
Proposition 1. Consider the finite horizon Ramsey model or the infinite horizon Ramsey
model with the instantaneous utility function that satisfies (11). A step-by-step intertem-
poral optimum coincides with the optimum in terms of consumption rates.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It follows that there exists a unique (non-degenerate) step-by-step intertemporal opti-
mum for each agent. It coincides with the unique optimum in terms of consumption rates,
and corresponds to the unique optimum in terms of consumption levels for this agent.
5 Voting over consumption rates
5.1 Intertemporal majority voting: infinite horizon example
Let us provide another simple example to gain some intuition about our voting approach.
Consider the infinite horizon problem with the same logarithmic instantaneous utility
function for all agents and the Cobb–Douglas production function. Given k0 > 0, the
optimization problem in terms of consumption levels for agent i is as follows:
max
∞∑
t=0
δti ln ct,
s. t. ct + kt+1 = kαt , ct ≥ 0, kt+1 ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . .
13This is exactly the Nash equilibrium sequence of consumption rates.
14The class of instantaneous utility functions that satisfy this requirement is very similar to the class
singled out and considered by Ekeland and Scheinkman (1986).
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The optimization problem in terms of consumption rates et = ctkαt for agent i takes the
form
max
{
ln (e0k
α
0 ) + δi ln
(
e1(1− e0)αkα20
)
+ δ2i ln
(
e2(1− e1)α(1− e0)α2kα30
)
+ . . .
}
.
It is well-known that the savings rate of agent i in this problem is constant and equal
to αδi. Therefore her optimal consumption rate is also constant over time and equal to
1− αδi. Hence the optimum in terms of consumption rates for agent i is given by
{1− αδi, 1− αδi, . . .}.
Consider intertemporal majority voting over consumption rates. Let τ be an arbitrarily
chosen point in time. Suppose the economy is at the state kτ > 0, and agents have some
expectations about future consumption rates, {et}∞t=τ+1.
The objective function of agent i in voting over eτ is given by
ln (eτ (kτ )
α) + δi ln
(
eτ+1(1− eτ )α(kτ )α2
)
+δ2i ln
(
eτ+2(1− eτ+1)α(1− eτ )α2(kτ )α3
)
+ . . . =
ln eτ + αδi ln(1− eτ ) + α2δ2i ln(1− eτ ) + . . .+ Γiτ =
ln eτ + αδi (1 + αδi + . . .) ln(1− eτ ) + Γiτ ,
where
Γiτ = ln ((kτ )
α) + δi ln
(
eτ+1(kτ )
α2
)
+ δ2i ln
(
eτ+2(1− eτ+1)α(kτ )α3
)
+ . . .
depends on kτ and expectations, but not on the variable over which agents vote.
By maximizing this objective function with respect to eτ , agent i obtains her preferred
time τ consumption rate. Solving the equation
d
deτ
(
ln eτ +
αδi
1− αδi ln(1− eτ )
)
= 0,
we find that the preferred time τ consumption rate for agent i is 1−αδi. Note that in this
example due to the log-linear utility functions and the Cobb–Douglas production function,
the preferred time τ consumption rate for each agent is independent of expectations.15
Moreover, for each agent the preferred time τ consumption rate coincides with the optimal
consumption rate.
It is clear that preferences of agents in one-dimensional voting over the time τ con-
sumption rate are single-peaked and the preferred consumption rate negatively depends
on δi. By the median voter theorem, the winner in majority voting over the time τ
consumption rate is the preferred consumption rate for the median agent, 1− αδmed.
Thus we obtain the sequence {1 − αδmed, 1 − αδmed, . . .}, each element of which is a
Condorcet winner in voting over the corresponding consumption rate. It is natural to
call this sequence an intertemporal voting equilibrium. Clearly, an intertemporal voting
equilibrium coincides with the optimum in terms of consumption rates for the agent with
the median discount factor.
15In a number of papers (see Borissov et al., 2014a,b; Borissov and Pakhnin, 2014), this fact is used to
generalize the considered example to voting in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Because of
the log-linear utility functions and the Cobb–Douglas production function, it is possible to find a closed-
form solution for the preferred policy of each agent, and explicitly calculate the winner in intertemporal
majority voting.
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5.2 Voting equilibria
Let us describe formally intertemporal majority voting over consumption rates. We define
our voting procedure in two stages. First, for an arbitrary point in time τ we define a time
τ (temporary) voting equilibrium. This is a Condorcet winner in voting over the current
consumption rate under given current state of the economy kτ > 0 and expectations about
future consumption rates. Secondly, we use the fact that the current state of the economy
contains all relevant information about past decisions and define an intertemporal voting
equilibrium. It is a sequence, each element of which is a time τ voting equilibrium provided
agents have perfect foresight about future consumption rates.
Consider an arbitrary point in time τ . Suppose the capital stock is kτ > 0, and
agents have some expectations about future consumption rates, Eτ+1,T = {et}Tt=τ+1.16 We
assume that expectations are non-degenerate (0 < et < 1 for all t except the terminal
time T in the finite horizon problem). The objective function of agent i in voting over
the time τ consumption rate is of the form (9):
V iτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,T ) =
T∑
t=τ
δt−τi ui (etf ((1− et−1)f ((1− et−2)f(. . . f(kτ ))))) . (12)
In the context of voting behaviour, we call a time τ temporary optimum for agent i,
i.e., a solution to the following one-dimensional optimization problem,
max
0≤eτ≤1
V iτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,T ), (13)
the preferred time τ consumption rate for agent i. It follows that in the finite horizon
problem the preferred time T consumption rate is the same for all agents and equal to
eiT = 1.
Definition. We call ev∗τ (kτ , Eτ+1,T ) a time τ voting equilibrium if it is a Condorcet
winner in one-dimensional voting over the time τ consumption rate, where non-degenerate
expectations Eτ+1,T are considered as given.
Clearly in the finite horizon case at time T agents vote unanimously, and the terminal
time T voting equilibrium is ev∗T = 1.
We want to emphasize that our institutional framework is well-defined without any
restrictions on agents’ expectations. The expectations may not be the same for all agents,
and may not even be correct. In any case, even without perfect foresight, voting over
the current consumption rate is a well-defined one-dimensional decision problem, and the
following Proposition holds.
Proposition 2. For any non-degenerate expectations Eτ+1,T , preferences of each agent in
voting over the time τ consumption rate are strictly concave and single-peaked. Therefore,
the median voter theorem applies.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3, which is proved in Appendix B.
Hence at each given point in time there exists the instantaneous Condorcet winner,
which is by definition a time τ voting equilibrium.
16For simplicity of notation, we drop the superscript i from expectations, though as a general rule each
agent has its own expectations.
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Now suppose that agents vote step by step starting from time 0. At time 0 agents have
some expectations about future consumption rates, E1,T , and the initial capital stock k0
is given. The winner in voting over the time 0 consumption rate, time 0 voting equi-
librium ev∗0 (k0, E1,T ), generically depends on expectations. Then, at time 1, all relevant
information about the decision made at time 0 is gathered in the new capital stock, since
k1 = (1− ev∗0 (k0, E1,T ))f(k0). Agents vote over the time 1 consumption rate given k1 and
some expectations about future consumption rates, E2,T . And so on. At every date τ ,
the current capital stock kτ is unambiguously determined by the past voting decisions.
Hence for every τ ∈ T, kτ+1 is a function of k0 and the past values of consumption rates
E0,τ , given by (10).
Definition. We call a sequence Ev∗0,T = {ev∗τ }Tτ=0 an intertemporal voting equilibrium
starting from k0 > 0 if
ev∗τ = e
v∗
τ
(
k0,τ (k0, E
v∗
0,τ−1), E
v∗
τ+1,T
)
, τ ∈ T,
and 0 < ev∗τ < 1 for all τ except the terminal time T in the finite horizon problem.
Thus Ev∗0,T = {ev∗τ }Tτ=0 is an intertemporal voting equilibrium if each ev∗τ is a time τ
voting equilibrium under kτ = k0,τ (k0, Ev∗0,τ−1),17 and perfect foresight about future con-
sumption rates, Ev∗τ+1,T = {ev∗t }Tt=τ+1. Conditions 0 < ev∗τ < 1 (for all τ except the terminal
time T in the finite horizon problem) rule our degenerate intertemporal voting equilibria
of the form {1, 1, . . .}. We are interested only in the non-degenerate intertemporal voting
equilibria.
Technically, an intertemporal voting equilibrium is a sequence, every element of which
is chosen by a majority of agents provided all other consumption rates are already chosen
according to the same procedure. Hence an intertemporal voting equilibrium is essentially
a Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium.
6 Intertemporal voting equilibrium: identical instanta-
neous utility functions
Consider the special, but important case where all agents have the same instantaneous
utility function u(c), so that agents are heterogeneous only in their time preferences. Let
us show that the intertemporal voting equilibrium is the optimum in terms of consumption
rates for the median agent (i.e., for the agent with the median discount factor).
Proposition 3. Suppose all agents have the same instantaneous utility function and the
same expectations. A time τ voting equilibrium exists, is unique, and coincides with the
preferred time τ consumption rate for the agent with the median discount factor.
Proof. Here we give only a sketch the proof. For the details, see Appendix B.
It follows from Lemma 3 that preferences of each agent in voting over the time τ con-
sumption rate are strictly concave and therefore single-peaked. We also prove (see Lemma
4) that if agents have the same instantaneous utility function and the same expectations,
then higher values of the discount factor correspond to lower values of the preferred time
τ consumption rate. Hence by the median voter theorem, a time τ voting equilibrium is
the preferred consumption rate for the agent with the median discount factor.
17It should be noticed that the sequence Ev∗0,τ−1 contains the first τ elements from the intertemporal voting
equilibrium Ev∗0,T . That is, E
v∗
0,τ−1 = {ev∗t }τ−1t=0 .
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Combining Propositions 1 and 3, we can formulate the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose all agents have the same instantaneous utility function. Consider
the finite horizon Ramsey model or the infinite horizon Ramsey model with the instan-
taneous utility function that satisfies (11). An intertemporal voting equilibrium starting
from any k0 > 0 is unique and coincides with the optimum in terms of consumption rates
for the agent with the median discount factor.
Proof. Proposition 3 states that a time τ voting equilibrium is the time τ temporary
optimum for the median agent. Taking into account the definition of a step-by-step
intertemporal optimum, it follows from Proposition 1 that an intertemporal voting equi-
librium is the optimum in terms of consumption rates for the agent with the median
discount factor.
By (6), there is a one-to-one correspondence between the optimum in terms of con-
sumption rates and the optimum in terms of consumption levels. It follows that there
is a one-to-one correspondence between the intertemporal voting equilibrium and the op-
timum in terms of consumption levels for the median agent. Thus the proposed voting
mechanism yields the optimum in terms of consumption levels for the median agent as
the stable outcome.
7 Balanced-growth and steady-state voting equilibria
In this section we study an intertemporal voting equilibrium in the general case. Suppose
that agents differ both in their time preferences and utility functions. Clearly, there is no
reason to expect that the result of Theorem 1 still holds in this case. There are no results
for the general case even when all agents have CES utility functions. Because of multi-
dimensional heterogeneity, it is in principle impossible to claim that an intertemporal
voting equilibrium is determined by the discount factor alone.
However, there are two special cases in which we are able to provide some results even
with multi-dimensional heterogeneity. The first is the case of a linear production function
and CES utility functions. Under these assumptions, we define a balanced-growth voting
equilibrium. The second is the case of a strictly concave production function where we
define and characterize a steady-state voting equilibrium. It is clear that these two cases
are essentially different.
7.1 Linear production function
Consider the CES utility function:
ui(c) =
{
c1−ρi
1−ρi , if 0 < ρi < +∞, ρi 6= 1,
ln c, if ρi = 1,
and the AK production function,
f(k) = Ak, A > 0.
The optimization problem in terms of consumption levels for agent i is as follows:
max
∞∑
t=0
δtiui(ct),
s. t. ct + kt+1 = Akt, ct ≥ 0, kt+1 ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
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where k0 is given.
We assume that for any i,
δiA
1−ρi < 1. (14)
The first-order conditions for the optimal solution {ci∗t , ki∗t+1}∞t=0 can be expressed as
u′i(c
i∗
t )
u′i(c
i∗
t+1)
=
(
ci∗t+1
ci∗t
)ρi
= δif
′(ki∗t+1) = δiA,
and hence
ci∗t+1 = (δiA)
1
ρi ci∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . ,
ki∗t+1 = (δiA)
1
ρi ki∗t , t = 0, 1, . . . .
Therefore, regardless of initial conditions, optimal consumption and the capital stock
for agent i grow at a constant rate γi given by
1 + γi = (δiA)
1
ρi . (15)
To ensure that the discounted utility is finite, the condition 1+γi < A should hold, which
is equivalent to (14). Thus for each agent i and for any k0 there is a unique optimal path
which is a balanced-growth optimum.
Consider the constant sequence of consumption rates, E = {e, e, . . .}. Then for any ini-
tial state k0, consumption and the capital stock from the corresponding sequence {C,K}
grow at a constant rate γ = (1− e)A− 1:
kt+1 = (1− e)Akt, t = 0, 1, . . . ,
ct+1 = eAkt+1 = e(1− e)A2kt = (1− e)Act, t = 0, 1, . . . .
Now let us introduce the notion of a balanced-growth voting equilibrium.
Definition. We call e∗ a balanced-growth voting equilibrium starting from k0 > 0 if
the sequence {e∗, e∗, . . .} is an intertemporal voting equilibrium starting from k0.
Clearly, agents’ heterogeneity is multi-dimensional, since agents differ both in the
discount factors and in the elasticities of intertemporal substitution. However, due to
the linear production function, agents’ heterogeneity can in some sense be considered as
one-dimensional, because agents are naturally characterized by their growth rates that
combine both heterogeneity parameters. The following theorem shows that the outcome
of voting is fully determined by the preferences of the agent with the median growth rate.
Theorem 2. For any k0, there is a unique balanced-growth voting equilibrium. It is given
by
e∗ = 1− 1
A
(1 + γmed),
where γmed is the median growth rate.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that e∗ is the optimal consumption rate for the agent with the median growth
rate γmed. Moreover, it is easily seen that the sequence {C∗, K∗} corresponding to the
sequence E∗ = {e∗, e∗, . . .} is the balanced-growth optimum for this agent.
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7.2 Strictly concave production function
Now let us define a steady-state voting equilibrium in the model with the production
function that satisfies (3).
If the sequence of consumption rates is constant, E = {e, e, . . .}, then the considered
model becomes the Solow model with the unique non-degenerate steady-state capital stock
k(e) which is the positive solution to the following equation18 in k:
k = (1− e)f(k). (16)
Definition. We call e∗ a steady-state voting equilibrium if the sequence {e∗, e∗, . . .}
is an intertemporal voting equilibrium starting from k0 = k(e∗) > 0.
Suppose first that all agents have the same instantaneous utility function that satisfies
(11). It follows from Theorem 1 that for any k0 there is a unique intertemporal voting
equilibrium, which corresponds to the optimum for the agent with the median discount
factor. Take as the initial capital stock the value k∗ determined by the “modified golden
rule” for the median agent:
δmedf
′(k∗) = 1. (17)
The optimum for the agent with the median discount factor starting from k0 = k∗ is
her steady-state optimum. The corresponding optimum in terms of consumption rates
is a constant sequence E∗ = {e∗, e∗, . . .}, and by Theorem 1 is a unique intertemporal
voting equilibrium. Clearly, e∗ and k∗ are linked by equation (16). Hence e∗, the optimal
consumption rate for the agent with the median discount factor δmed, is the unique steady-
state voting equilibrium.
Since k∗ is given by the “modified golden rule” (17), and e∗ depends only on the median
discount factor, the steady-state voting equilibrium does not depend on the instantaneous
utility function of agents. This observation leads to the following theorem which holds in
the general case where agents have different utility functions.
Theorem 3. There is a unique steady-state voting equilibrium. It is given by
e∗ = 1− k
∗
f(k∗)
, (18)
where k∗ is a solution to equation (17).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Note that e∗ is the optimal consumption rate for the agent with the median dis-
count factor δmed. Clearly, the sequence {C∗, K∗} corresponding to the sequence E∗ =
{e∗, e∗, . . .} is the steady-state optimum for this agent.
It is well-known that in the Ramsey model with the production function that satisfies
(3), the optimal path of each agent converges to the steady-state optimum. The steady-
state consumption is fully determined by the production function and the steady-state
capital stock. The steady-state capital stock, defined by the “modified golden rule”, de-
pends on the discount factor of the agent, and is independent of her instantaneous utility
function.
Hence the optimum in terms of consumption rates for each agent converges to the
steady-state optimum, which is determined by the discount factor of the agent and is
18The nonzero solution to the following equation exists if (1− e)f ′(0) > 1.
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independent of her instantaneous utility function. Does in our framework every intertem-
poral voting equilibrium converge to the steady-state voting equilibrium? Is the outcome
of voting in the general case eventually determined by the discount factors of the agents
(more precisely, by the median discount factor)? It is a topic for further research, whether
it is possible to generalize the standard Ramsey model results to voting equilibria.
8 Conclusion
The problem of collective choice naturally arises in many economic applications. It is
reasonable to conjecture that the outcome of majority voting coincides with the optimum
for the “median” agent whenever this notion is well-defined. However, if the choice space
is multi-dimensional, there are difficulties in achieving this outcome.
In this paper we study a Ramsey-type model with common consumption and agents
who have different discount factors and utility functions. Agents choose consumption
stream from the set of all feasible consumption streams by majority voting. It is known
that there is no Condorcet winner in voting over feasible consumption streams in the
Ramsey model. We propose a simple and natural voting rule which picks the optimum
for the median agent as a stable outcome in many important cases.
Our intertemporal majority voting is based on two principles. First, voting over
the multi-dimensional sequence is replaced by the step-by-step sequence of the one-
dimensional votes. Second, agents vote over the consumption rate instead of consumption
level. We define a temporary voting equilibrium, which is a Condorcet winner in voting
over the current consumption rate under some expectations about future consumption
rates. Then we define an intertemporal voting equilibrium as a sequence, each element
of which is a temporary voting equilibrium provided agents have perfect foresight about
future consumption rates. From the technical point of view, an intertemporal voting
equilibrium is a Kramer–Shepsle equilibrium in terms of consumption rates.
Our main result concerns the case where agents have the same instantaneous utility
function and differ only in their discount factors. We prove that an intertemporal voting
equilibrium exists, is unique, and coincides with the optimum in terms of consumption
rates for the agent with the median discount factor. It follows that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the intertemporal voting equilibrium and the optimum in terms
of consumption levels for the median agent. We thus show that even in the absence of
a Condorcet winner there is a stable outcome of majority voting. Since this outcome is
determined by the preferences of the agent with the median discount factor, it is both
time-consistent and Pareto efficient.
We also consider the general framework in which agents differ in their utility functions,
and analyze two special cases. In the case of a linear production function and CES
utility functions, we define a balanced-growth voting equilibrium, prove its uniqueness
and show that it is determined by the median growth rate. In the case of a strictly
concave production function, we define a steady-state voting equilibrium, and show that
it is unique and only depends on the median discount factor.
Our analysis suggests that in the case of a strictly concave production function the
analogy with the standard Ramsey model may fruitfully be applied. One may conjecture
that every intertemporal voting equilibrium converges to the steady-state voting equilib-
rium, and thus that the winner of the voting procedure eventually depends only on the
discount factor. However, further research is needed to confirm or to reject this conjecture.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
A.1 Useful notation
Recall that
Eτ,t = {eτ , eτ+1, . . . , et}.
Let for arbitrary τ and t > τ ,
kτ,τ = kτ ,
kτ,τ+1(kτ , Eτ,τ ) = (1− eτ )f (kτ,τ ) ,
. . . ,
kτ,t+1(kτ , Eτ,t) = (1− et)f (kτ,t(kτ , Eτ,t−1)) .
Let also
fτ,τ = f (kτ ) ,
fτ,τ+1(kτ , Eτ,τ ) = f ((1− eτ )fτ,τ ) ,
. . . ,
fτ,t+1(kτ , Eτ,t) = f ((1− et)fτ,t(kτ , Eτ,t−1)) .
Thus for t > τ , kτ,t are linked with fτ,t as follows:
kτ,t+1(kτ , Eτ,t) = (1− et)fτ,t (kτ , Eτ,t−1) ,
fτ,t+1(kτ , Eτ,t) = f (kτ,t+1(kτ , Eτ,t)) .
For simplicity of notation, we often drop the arguments of these functions when they
play no significant role. However, the reader should bear in mind that fτ,t+1 is a function
of the t+ 1 consumption rates {eτ , eτ+1, . . . , et}.
The derivatives of fτ,t+1 can be obtained using a chain rule of differentiation:
∂fτ,t+1
∂et
= −f ′(kτ,t+1)fτ,t,
∂fτ,t+1
∂et−1
= −f ′(kτ,t+1)(1− et)f ′(kτ,t)fτ,t−1,
. . . .
It is clear that the derivative of fτ,t+1(kτ , Eτ,t) with respect to each consumption rate
{eτ , eτ+1, . . . , et} is negative.
A.2 The first-order conditions
The solution to problem (4) for an arbitrary agent is characterized by the first-order
conditions and the transversality condition. The first-order conditions are given by
u′(ct)
u′(ct+1)
= δf ′(kt+1), t = 0, 1, . . . (T − 1).19 (19)
19The notation t = 0, 1, . . . (T − 1) means that these equations hold for all t except the terminal time T
in the finite horizon problem.
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The transversality condition in the finite horizon problem is as follows:
kT+1 = 0. (20)
In the infinite horizon problem, the transversality condition is given by
lim
t→∞
δtu′(ct)kt+1 = 0. (21)
Let us show that the sequence {C∗, K∗} which is constructed according to (6) and cor-
responds to a step-by-step intertemporal optimum E∗, satisfies the first-order conditions
(19).
From the definition of a step-by-step intertemporal optimum we immediately obtain
that a step-by-step intertemporal optimum E∗ satisfies the following system of equations:
∂Vt (k0,t(k0, E0,t−1), et, Et+1,T )
∂et
= 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , (T − 1). (22)
Consider two adjacent equations of the system of equations (22), for t = τ and for
t = τ + 1. The equation for t = τ is as follows:
∂u (eτf0,τ (k0, E0,τ−1))
∂eτ
+ δ
∂u (eτ+1f0,τ+1(k0, E0,τ ))
∂eτ
+ . . . = 0.
Writing out derivatives, we obtain:
u′(eτf0,τ )f0,τ =
δu′(eτ+1f0,τ+1)eτ+1f ′(k0,τ+1)f0,τ+
δ2u′(eτ+2f0,τ+2)eτ+2f ′(k0,τ+2)(1− eτ+1)f ′(k0,τ+1)f0,τ+
δ3u′(eτ+3f0,τ+3)eτ+3f ′(k0,τ+3)(1− eτ+2)f ′(k0,τ+2)(1− eτ+1)f ′(k0,τ+1)f0,τ + . . . .
Dividing both parts of the above equation by f0,τ > 0, we get
u′(eτf0,τ ) =
δf ′(k0,τ+1)[eτ+1u′(eτ+1f0,τ+1) + (1− eτ+1)δeτ+2u′(eτ+2f0,τ+2)f ′(k0,τ+2)+
(1− eτ+1)δ2(1− eτ+2)eτ+3u′(eτ+3f0,τ+3)f ′(k0,τ+3)f ′(k0,τ+2) + . . .].
(23)
The equation for t = τ + 1 is as follows:
∂u (eτ+1f0,τ+1(k0, E0,τ ))
∂eτ+1
+ δ
∂u (eτ+2f0,τ+2(k0, E0,τ+1))
∂eτ+1
+ . . . = 0,
or, equivalently (dividing both parts of the resulting equation by f0,τ+1 > 0),
u′(eτ+1f0,τ+1) =
δeτ+2u
′(eτ+2f0,τ+2)f ′(k0,τ+2)+
δ2(1− eτ+2)eτ+3u′(eτ+3f0,τ+3)f ′(k0,τ+3)f ′(k0,τ+2) + . . . .
The right-hand side of the above equation appears also in the right-hand side of equa-
tion (23). Substituting, we get
u′(eτf0,τ ) =
δf ′(k0,τ+1) (eτ+1u′(eτ+1f0,τ+1) + (1− eτ+1)u′(eτ+1f0,τ+1)) =
δf ′(k0,τ+1)u′(eτ+1f0,τ+1).
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Applying this argument for τ = 0, 1, . . . , (T − 1), we obtain that system of equations
(22) is equivalent to the system
u′(etf0,t) = δf ′(k0,t+1)u′(et+1f0,t+1), t = 0, 1, . . . , (T − 1). (24)
Now it is straightforward to see that the mapping defined by (6) converts the system
of equations (24) to the system of the first-order conditions (19).
A.3 The transversality condition
It remains to show that the sequence {C∗, K∗} corresponding to a step-by-step intertem-
poral optimum satisfies the transversality condition.
Consider the case T < ∞. Then the transversality condition (20) follows from the
fact that the optimal extraction rate at the terminal time T for every agent is ei∗T = 1. At
the terminal time it is optimal to consume everything.
Consider the case T =∞. Using (24), we can replace expressions of the form
δt−(τ+1)u′(etf0,t)f ′(k0,t)f ′(k0,t−1) · . . . · f ′(k0,τ+1)
in the right-hand side of equation (23) with u′(eτf0,τ ). Hence equation (23) can be rewrit-
ten as follows:
u′(eτf0,τ )− eτ+1u′(eτf0,τ )−
(1− eτ+1)eτ+2u′(eτf0,τ )− (1− eτ+1)(1− eτ+2)eτ+3u′(eτf0,τ )−
(1− eτ+1)(1− eτ+2)(1− eτ+3)eτ+4u′(eτf0,τ )− . . . =
u′(eτf0,τ )(1− eτ+1)(1− eτ+2)(1− eτ+3 − (1− eτ+3)eτ+4u′(eτf0,τ )− . . .) = 0.
Thus we come to the condition
u′(eτf0,τ )(1− eτ+1)(1− eτ+2)(1− eτ+3) · · · = 0.
Since τ is chosen arbitrarily, and u′ > 0, it follows that
∞∏
t=1
(1− et) = 0,
which is equivalent to
∞∑
t=1
et = +∞. (25)
Now let us show that the sequence {ct, kt+1}∞t=0 which is constructed according to (6)
and corresponds to the solution to the system (22), always satisfies the transversality
condition (21). Recall that
ct = etf(kt). (26)
Consider separately the model with the AK production function, and the model with
the production function satisfying properties (3).
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A.3.1 Linear production function
Suppose f(k) = Ak, A 6= 0. The first-order conditions state that
Atδtu′(ct) = u′(c0) t = 1, 2, . . . . (27)
Assume that the transversality condition (21) fails. Then there exist T and N > 0
such that for all t > T , δtu′(ct)kt+1 ≥ N . Using (27), we infer that for all t > T ,
kt+1
At
≥ N
u′(c0)
. (28)
It follows from (26) and (28) that for all t > T ,
et+1 =
ct+1
Akt+1
≤ u
′(c0)
N
ct+1
At+1
.
Therefore, by (25),
∞∑
t=T
ct+1
At+1
= +∞.
However, iterating the equation ct + kt+1 = Akt, we easily get
c0 +
c1
A
+
c2
A2
+ . . . ≤ Ak0.
Hence we arrive at a contradiction. The transversality condition (21) holds for f(k) = Ak.
A.3.2 Strictly concave production function
Suppose that f(k) satisfies the following properties:
f(0) = 0, f ′(k) > 0, f ′′(k) < 0, ∃k¯ : f(k¯) = k¯, δminf ′(0) > 1.
Our goal is to consider the possible dynamics of the sequence {ct, kt+1}∞t=0. We begin with
two important lemmas.
Lemma 1. Suppose that δf ′(kT+1) > 1 for some T , and kT+1 ≤ kT . Then the transver-
sality condition (21) holds.
Proof. Let us show that the conditions of lemma imply kt+1 < kt for all t ≥ T . Indeed,
from δf ′(kT+1) > 1 and the first-order conditions we get u′(cT ) > u′(cT+1), or cT+1 > cT .
Moreover,
kT+2 − kT+1 = (f(kT+1)− f(kT )) + (cT − cT+1) < 0.
Thus kT+2 < kT+1 and hence δf ′(kT+2) > 1. Repeating the argument, we infer that for
all t > T ,
kt+1 < kT , and u′(ct) < u′(cT ).
Therefore, starting from t = T ,
δtu′(ct)kt+1 < δtu′(cT )kT ,
and
lim
t→∞
δtu′(ct)kt+1 = 0.
This proves Lemma 1.
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Lemma 2. Suppose that there exists T such that δf ′(kt+1) ≤ 1 for all t ≥ T . Then the
transversality condition (21) holds.
Proof. Since δf ′(0) > 1, it follows that for t > T , kt ≥ (f ′)−1(1/δ) > 0. Hence f(kt) ≥
f((f ′)−1(1/δ)) > 0, and from (26) we get
ct = etf(kt) ≥ etf
(
(f ′)−1(1/δ)
)
, t > T.
Therefore due to (25),
∞∑
t=T
ct = +∞. (29)
We claim that (29) is impossible if the transversality condition (21) fails. Indeed, since
there is k¯ such that 0 < f(k¯) = k¯ < +∞, kt is bounded from above. Thus the failure of
the transversality condition means that there exists N > 0 such that for all t > T ,
δtu′(ct) ≥ N. (30)
Let us show that from the regularity condition (11) and (30) it follows that∑∞
t=T ct < +∞. We have:
δtu′(ct) ≥ N ⇔ ct ≤ (u′)−1(Nδ−t)⇔
∞∑
t=T
ct ≤
∞∑
t=T
(u′)−1(Nδ−t).
The series in the right-hand side of the last inequality converges if and only if the following
integral converges at infinity:∫ ∞
T
(u′)−1(Nδ−t)dt =
∫ ∞
Nδ−T
(u′)−1(y)
y
dy.
By the limit comparison test for improper integrals we infer that its convergence is equiv-
alent to the existence of the limit
lim
y→∞
(u′)−1(y) · yκ = L,
where 0 < L < ∞, and κ > 0. It follows from (11) that this limit exists, so we arrive at
a contradiction with (29).
This proves Lemma 2.
Now let us consider different cases that may arise. If δf ′(kt+1) ≤ 1 for all sufficiently
large t, then the transversality condition (21) holds by Lemma 2.
Suppose there exists T such that δf ′(kT+1) > 1. Then there are only two possibilities.
Either there exists T1 > T such that δf ′(kT1+1) ≤ 1 or δf ′(kt+1) > 1 for all t > T . In
the former case, either δf ′(kt+1) ≤ 1 for all t > T1 so that Lemma 2 holds or there exists
T2 > T1 such that δf ′(kT2+1) > 1 in which case we are in the conditions of Lemma 1. In
the latter case, for all t > T , u′(ct) < u′(cT ) and kt+1 ≤ (f ′)−1(1/δ). Therefore,
δtu′(ct)kt+1 < δtu′(cT )(f ′)−1(1/δ),
which implies
lim
t→∞
δtu′(ct)kt+1 = 0.
Thus we have described the possible dynamics of the sequence {ct, kt+1}∞t=0 correspond-
ing to the solution to the system of equations (22). We have shown that the transversality
condition (21) is always satisfied.
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B Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Consider how agents vote over the time τ consumption rate.
Lemma 3. For any given non-degenerate expectations Eτ+1,T preferences of each agent in
voting over the time τ consumption rate are strictly concave and therefore single-peaked.
Moreover, the preferred time τ consumption rate for agent i is a solution to the equation
∂V iτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,T )
∂eτ
= 0, τ = 0, 1, . . . (T − 1), (31)
where the objective function V iτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,T ) is given by (12).
Proof. Consider agent i with the discount factor δi and the instantaneous utility function
ui(c). Let us show that for all τ (except τ = T in the finite horizon case) and for any given
non-degenerate expectations Eτ+1,T , her preferred time τ consumption rate is a unique
solution to equation (31).
Equation (31) can be rewritten as
u′i (eτf(kτ )) = δiu
′
i(eτ+1f(kτ,τ+1))eτ+1f
′(kτ,τ+1)+
+δ2i u
′
i(eτ+2f(kτ,τ+2))eτ+2f
′(kτ,τ+2)(1− eτ+1)f ′(kτ,τ+1) + . . . , (32)
where we have divided both parts of the equation by f(kτ ) > 0.
Consider the left-hand side of equation (32) as a function of eτ :
Φiτ (eτ ) = u
′
i(eτf(kτ )).
It is clear that Φiτ (0) = +∞, and
dΦiτ
deτ
= u′′i (eτf(kτ ))f(kτ ) < 0.
Consider also the right-hand side of equation (32) as a function of eτ :
Ψ iτ (eτ ) = δiu
′
i (eτ+1f((1− eτ )f(kτ ))) eτ+1f ′ ((1− eτ )f(kτ )) +
δ2i u
′
i (eτ+2f((1− eτ+1)f((1− eτ )f(kτ )))) ·
·eτ+2f ′ ((1− eτ+1)f((1− eτ )f(kτ ))) (1− eτ+1)f ′ ((1− eτ )f(kτ )) + . . . .
Calculate its derivative (divided by f(kτ ) > 0):
dΨ iτ
deτ
= −δiu′′i (eτ+1f(kτ,τ+1)) (eτ+1f ′(kτ,τ+1))2−
δieτ+1u
′
i(eτ+1f(kτ,τ+1))f
′′(kτ,τ+1)− . . .−
δ2i u
′′
i (eτ+2f(kτ,τ+2)) (eτ+2f
′(kτ,τ+2)(1− eτ+1)f ′(kτ,τ+1))2−
δ2i u
′
i(eτ+2f(kτ,τ+2))eτ+2f
′′(kτ,τ+2) ((1− eτ+1)f ′(kτ,τ+1))2 − . . .−
δ2i u
′
i(eτ+2f(kτ,τ+2))eτ+2f
′(kτ,τ+2)(1− eτ+1)f ′′(kτ,τ+1)− . . . .
Due to the strict concavity of ui and concavity of f ,
dΨ iτ
deτ
> 0.
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Note that this result holds even when f(k) is linear, i.e., if f ′′(k) = 0.
Each term in Ψ iτ contains a multiplier of the form
u′i (etf ((1− et−1)f ((1− et−2)f (· · · f ((1− eτ )f(kτ )))))) .
Clearly, if eτ = 1, then f(0) = 0, and therefore Ψ iτ (1) = +∞.
It follows that there exists a unique solution to the equation
Φiτ (eτ ) = Ψ
i
τ (eτ ),
and this solution lies strictly in (0, 1). Thus there is a unique time τ preferred consumption
rate for agent i.
Note also that we have
∂2V iτ
∂e2τ
=
d
deτ
(
Φiτ (eτ )− Ψ iτ (eτ )
)
< 0,
so the preferences of agent i in voting over the time τ consumption rate are strictly
concave.
Since time τ and agent i were chosen arbitrarily, this actually implies that the prefer-
ences of each agent in voting over every consumption rate are single-peaked.
Proposition 2 immediately follows from Lemma 3. Now let us show that when agents
have the same instantaneous utility function and the same expectations, for all τ (except
τ = T in the finite horizon case) higher values of the discount factor δi correspond to
lower values of the preferred time τ consumption rate ei∗τ .
Lemma 4. Suppose all agents have the same instantaneous utility function u(c) and the
same non-degenerate expectations Eτ+1,T . If δi > δj, then ei∗τ < ej∗τ .
Proof. It follows from (31) by the implicit function theorem that
dei∗τ
dδi
= −
(
∂2V iτ
∂eτ∂δi
)
/
(
∂2V iτ
∂e2τ
)
.
By Lemma 3, we know that
∂2V iτ
∂e2τ
< 0.
It is also clear that
∂2V iτ (eτ )
∂eτ∂δi
=
∂
∂δi
(
Φiτ (eτ )− Ψ iτ (eτ )
)
= − ∂
∂δi
Ψ iτ (eτ ) =
−u′(eτ+1f(kτ,τ+1))eτ+1f ′(kτ,τ+1)−
2δiu
′(eτ+2f(kτ,τ+2))eτ+2f ′(kτ,τ+2)(1− eτ+1)f ′(kτ,τ+1)− . . . < 0.
So finally,
dei∗τ
dδi
< 0.
It follows from the median voter theorem that a time τ voting equilibrium is the
preferred consumption rate for the median agent.
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C Proof of Theorem 2
Let τ be an arbitrary point in time. Consider how agents vote over the time τ consumption
rate under constant non-degenerate expectations Eτ+1,∞ = {e, e, . . .}.
The objective function of agent i in the time τ voting problem under these expectations
is given by:
V iτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,∞) = ui (eτAkτ ) +
δiui (e(1− eτ )A2kτ ) + δ2i ui (e(1− e)(1− eτ )A3kτ ) + . . . .
It follows from Lemma 3 that preferences of agent i are concave, and her preferred
time τ consumption rate, ei∗τ , is the unique solution to the following equation:
∂V iτ (kτ , eτ , Eτ+1,∞)
∂eτ
= 0. (33)
Using the fact that u′i(c) = c−ρi , equation (33) takes the form
Akτ (eτAkτ )
−ρi = δieA2kτ
(
e(1− eτ )A2kτ
)−ρi +
δ2i e(1− e)A3kτ
(
e(1− e)(1− eτ )A3kτ
)−ρi + . . . .
Dividing both parts of the above equation by (Akτ )1−ρi , we get
(eτ )
−ρi = (1− eτ )−ρi
(
Aδie(Ae)
−ρi+
A2δi2e(1− e)(A2e(1− e))−ρi + . . .) ,
or (
1− eτ
eτ
)ρi
=
Aδi
(
e (Ae)−ρi + Aδie(1− e) (A2e(1− e))−ρi + . . .
)
.
It follows from (14) that
δi (A(1− e))1−ρi < 1,
so that the infinite series in the right-hand side converges. Therefore,
e (Ae)−ρi + Aδie(1− e)
(
A2e(1− e))−ρi + . . . =
A−ρi(e)1−ρi
(
1 + δi (A(1− e))1−ρi + δ2i (A(1− e))2(1−ρi) + . . .
)
=
A−ρie1−ρi
1− δi (A(1− e))1−ρ
.
Using (15) and the above equation, we conclude that the preferred time τ consumption
rate for agent i, ei∗τ , is a solution to the following equation:(
1− eτ
eτ
)ρi
=
(
1+γi
A
)ρi
e1−ρi
1− (1+γi
A
)ρi
(1− e)1−ρi . (34)
Note that the preferred time τ consumption rate for each agent is independent of the
current capital stock kτ , and depends only on constant expectations e.
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It can be easily checked that for all e 6= 0,
dei∗τ
dγi
< 0.
It follows that for any constant non-degenerate expectations e, the preferred time τ
consumption rates for different agents are naturally ordered by the agents’ growth rates:
γi < γj ⇒ ei∗τ > ej∗τ .
Hence for any time τ and any constant nonzero expectations e, the winner in voting
over the time τ consumption rate is the preferred time τ consumption rate for the agent
with the median growth rate γmed.
Thus the balanced-growth voting equilibrium is the preferred time τ consumption
rate for the median agent which coincides with constant expectations. It follows that the
balanced-growth voting equilibrium is a solution to (34) for γi = γmed, such that eτ = e.
It is clear that the balanced-growth voting equilibrium is unique, independent of k0, and
given by
e∗ = 1− 1
A
(1 + γmed).
D Proof of Theorem 3
Consider the constant sequence of consumption rates E∗ = {e∗, e∗, . . .}, where e∗ is given
by (18). Consider a fictitious agent with the discount factor δmed and instantaneous
utility function ui(c), i.e., the agent with the discount factor of the median agent and
instantaneous utility function of agent i. By the previous reasoning, the sequence E∗ is
the optimum in terms of consumption rates for this agent.
Let τ be an arbitrary point in time. Suppose that expectations of agents are constant
and equal to Eτ+1,∞ = {e∗, e∗, . . .}. It follows from Lemma 3 that preferences of each
agent in voting over the time τ consumption rate are strictly concave. Consider agent
i with the discount factor δi and the instantaneous utility function ui(c). She has the
unique preferred time τ consumption rate ei∗τ . Lemma 4 allows us to compare ei∗τ with e∗,
which is the preferred time τ consumption rate for the fictitious agent considered above.
It follows from Lemma 4 that if δi < δmed then ei∗τ > e∗. At the same time, if δi > δmed
then ei∗τ < e∗.
Hence the winner in voting over the time τ consumption rate under constant expec-
tations Eτ+1,∞ = {e∗, e∗, . . .} is precisely e∗ given by (18). Since the point in time τ is
chosen arbitrarily, e∗ is the winner in voting over each consumption rate under expecta-
tions {e∗, e∗, . . .}. Thus the sequence {e∗, e∗, . . .} is an intertemporal voting equilibrium,
and hence e∗ is a steady-state equilibrium.
It remains to show that this steady-state voting equilibrium is unique. Suppose that
there is another steady-state voting equilibrium e˜. Consider an arbitrary point in time τ .
Suppose that expectations of agents are constant and equal to Eτ+1,∞ = E˜ = {e˜, e˜, . . .}. It
follows from Lemma 3 that preferences of each agent in voting over the time τ consumption
rate are concave. By the median voter theorem, e˜ is the most preferred consumption rate
for some “median” voter. Clearly, e˜ is the preferred consumption rate for this same agent
for all τ = 0, 1, . . .. Therefore, the sequence {e˜, e˜, . . .} is a step-by-step intertemporal
optimum for this agent.
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Denote the discount factor of this agent by δ˜. Consider the corresponding k˜, which is
the unique positive solution to the equation k = (1− e˜)f(k). Clearly, k˜ is determined by
the “modified golden rule” for this agent: δ˜f ′(k˜) = 1. It follows that e˜ depends only on δ˜,
and is independent of the instantaneous utility function of this agent. In other words, e˜
is the preferred time τ consumption rate for the fictitious agent with the discount factor
δ˜ and any instantaneous utility function, in voting over eτ given kτ = k˜ and expectations
E˜.
Now suppose that e˜ > e∗, and thus δ˜ < δmed. Consider agent i with the discount
factor δi ≥ δmed and the instantaneous utility function ui(c). Lemma 4 allows us to
compare ei∗τ , the preferred time τ consumption rate for agent i, with e˜, the preferred time
τ consumption rate for the fictitious agent with the instantaneous utility function ui(c)
and the discount factor δ˜. Since δi > δ˜, Lemma 4 states that ei∗τ < e˜.
Hence for at least N+1
2
agents their preferred time τ consumption rates are lower then
e˜. It follows that e˜ is not a Condorcet winner in voting over the time τ consumption rate
under expectations E˜. Thus e˜ > e∗ cannot be a steady-state voting equilibrium.
In the case where e˜ < e∗, the previous argument can be slightly modified. Here for
at least N+1
2
agents their preferred time τ consumption rates in voting over the time τ
consumption rate under expectations E˜ are greater than e˜. Thus e˜ is not a Condorcet
winner in this voting, and cannot be a steady-state voting equilibrium.
It follows that e∗ is the unique steady-state voting equilibrium.
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